h5jb :UdZddlmZddlmZddlmZmZmZm Z erddl m Z ddl m Z mZgdZeej"hZeej&ej(ej*ej,ej.ej0hZeej4ej6ej8ej:hZej6ej6fej8ej8fej>ej@ejBfeded fiZ"d e#d <d Z$d%d Z%d&dZ&d'dZ'd(dZ( d) d*dZ) d+dZ*d,dZ+d-dZ,d.dZ-d/dZ.d/dZ/d/dZ0d0dZ1d/dZ2d/dZ3d/dZ4d/dZ5d/dZ6d/dZ7d/d Z8d/d!Z9Gd"d#Z:y$)1uHelpers for removing potentially unwanted content from a PDF. What is "safe" to remove from a PDF depends entirely on your use case and threat model. The functions in this module each perform one narrowly scoped, low-risk operation: they remove active or auxiliary content (scripts, embedded files, actions that reach the network or filesystem, multimedia and rich-media content, thumbnails, search indexes, Web Capture information, private application data, and the portfolio view) while leaving the standard page content, page geometry, and document metadata in place. These operations are *not* guaranteed to leave a document's appearance unchanged. PDF JavaScript, for example, can alter how a document renders, so removing it may change the result — although in practice most PDFs are designed to display correctly without it, since many viewers do not run PDF JavaScript. They deliberately do **not** strip XFA, AcroForm, annotations, the document ``/ID``, or metadata wholesale, because those operations frequently destroy legitimate document content. See the :doc:`Sanitizing PDFs ` topic for a discussion of the tradeoffs and the limits of what programmatic sanitization can accomplish. ) annotations) TYPE_CHECKING)Array DictionaryNameStream)Callable)ObjectPdf) Sanitizerremove_attachmentsremove_collectionremove_external_accessremove_javascriptremove_multimediaremove_private_app_dataremove_search_indexremove_thumbnailsremove_web_capturez/3Dz/3DDzdict[Name, tuple[Name, ...]]_MEDIA_ANNOT_KEYS2ct|ttfsyt|jtj tS)zReturn True if *obj* looks like a PDF action dictionary. Action dictionaries carry an ``/S`` (subtype) key whose value is a Name. Streams are permitted because an action's dictionary part may, rarely, be attached to a stream object. F) isinstancerrgetrS)objs F/var/www/html/qr/venv/lib/python3.12/site-packages/pikepdf/sanitize.py_is_action_dictrIs/ cJ/ 0 cggdffot ,,ct|sy|jtj}t |txr||vS)zEReturn True if *obj* is an action dict whose subtype is in *targets*.F)rrrrr)rtargetssubtypes r_is_targeted_actionr#Us5 3 ggdffoG gt $ ;G);;rc`|jr"|j}||vry|j|y)zTrack visited indirect objects to break cyclic /Next chains. Direct (inline) objects all report objgen ``(0, 0)`` and cannot be deduplicated this way; the recursion depth cap handles those. TF) is_indirectobjgenadd)rseenr&s r _cycle_hitr)]s-   T>  rc>t|tr t|S|gS)z@Normalize a /Next value (single action dict or Array) to a list.)rrlist)next_objs r _as_actionsr-ks(E"H~ :rc|jtj}|tk\s|yg}t |D]z}t ||rt ||||dzt||r=|jtj}|O|jt |j|j|||s|tj=yt|dk(r|d|tj<yt||tj<y)zPrune targeted actions from *action*'s /Next chain, in place. A pruned node's own (already-cleaned) /Next survivors are grafted upward so that legitimate downstream actions are preserved. Nr) rrNext_MAX_CHAIN_DEPTHr-r)_neutralize_next_chainr#extendappendlenr)actionr!r(depthr, survivorschildgrafteds rr2r2rszz$))$H   H$4 IX& $ eT " ugtUQY? ug .ii *G"  W!56   U # $  499  Y1 %aLtyy!),tyyrc|j|}| t|syt||ryt||r||=yt |||y)zNeutralize a single-action slot, e.g. an annotation's /A. If the action's subtype is targeted, the slot is deleted entirely; otherwise the action's /Next chain is pruned. N)rrr)r#r2)holderkeyr!r(r6s r_neutralize_slotr>sMZZ_F ~_V4&$67+ 3K67D1rc:|jtj}t|tsyt |j D]!}t|t||t#t|j dk(r|tj=yy)zNeutralize every event in *holder*'s /AA additional-actions dictionary. The /AA dictionary is dropped if it becomes empty. Nr) rrAArrr+keysr>setr5)r<r!aa event_keys r_neutralize_additional_actionsrEsr DGG B b* %"'')_> T)_gsu=> 2779~ 477Orc d|j}t|tj|t t |||j D]}|j}t |||jtj}t|tsK|D]C}t|tst|tj|t t ||E|jjr1|jj D]}t |j|t#||y)zCWalk all known action-holder slots and neutralize targeted actions.N)Rootr>r OpenActionrBrEpagesrrAnnotsrrrAacroformexistsfields_neutralize_outlines)pdfr!rootpagepobjannotsannotfields r_sanitize_actionsrWs 88DT4??GSU;"41 ?xx&tW5$++& fe $ ?!%4 ?.ug>  ? ? ||\\(( ?E *599g > ?w'rc,|jtj}t|tsyt }|jtj g}|r|j}t|ttfs)t||r6t|tj|t |j|jtj|j|jtj |ryy)zNeutralize targeted /A actions on every document outline item. Walks the outline tree via /First and /Next, descending into /First for children, with an objgen-based visited set to break cyclic or malformed sibling/child links. N)rrOutlinesrrrBFirstpoprr)r>rKr4r0)rQr!outlinesvisitedstackitems rrOrOsxx &H h +$'EG \\$** % &E yy{$V 45  dG $ tvvw6 TXXdii() TXXdjj)* rc:t|tt|y)avRemove all JavaScript from a PDF, in place. Purges document-level named JavaScript (the ``/Root/Names/JavaScript`` name tree) and every ``/JavaScript`` action reachable from document, page, annotation, form-field, and outline (bookmark) action slots, including actions chained via ``/Next``. Page content, annotations (minus their scripts), form fields, and metadata are left in place. Note that PDF JavaScript can alter how a document renders, so removing it may change the result; in practice most documents are designed to display correctly without it. The main legitimate use of PDF JavaScript is interactive form validation; removing it may break that. Most PDF viewers other than Acrobat do not fully execute PDF JavaScript and warn about or disable it. This operation is idempotent and safe to call on a PDF that contains no JavaScript. Args: pdf: The PDF to modify in place. Note: To scrub document metadata, use :meth:`pikepdf.Pdf.open_metadata` with ``set_pikepdf_as_editor=False`` instead; this function does not touch metadata. N)rW _JS_SUBTYPES_drop_named_javascriptrPs rrrs8c<(3rc|jjtj}t |t r%tj |vr|tj =yyy)z=Drop the document-level ``/Root/Names/JavaScript`` name tree.N)rGrrNamesrr JavaScript)rPnamess rrbrbsB HHLL $E%$E)A $// "*B$rc$|jD]S}t|ttfst |j t jsC|t j=U|jj|jj t j}t|tr#t j|vr|t j=|jD]}|jj t j}t|t s=|D]h}t|ts|j t j"t j$k(sEt j&|vsX|t j&=jy)uRemove all embedded files (attachments) from a PDF, in place. Clears the ``/Root/Names/EmbeddedFiles`` name tree (the :attr:`pikepdf.Pdf.attachments` mapping) and removes ``/AF`` (associated files) references from every object that carries one — the catalog, pages, annotations, XObjects, structure elements, and so on (PDF 2.0 14.13). As a precaution, an ``/AF`` reference is only removed if it points to an embedded file specification (one with an ``/EF`` entry), so an unrelated key that happens to be named ``/AF`` is left untouched. FileAttachment annotations are defanged by removing their embedded ``/FS`` file specification; the annotation itself is retained so page geometry is unchanged. Embedded files can be integral to a document, especially in digital-signing workflows, so remove them deliberately. This operation is idempotent and safe to call on a PDF that has no attachments. Args: pdf: The PDF to modify in place. N)objectsrrr_af_holds_embedded_filerrAF attachmentsclearrGre EmbeddedFilesrIrrJrSubtypeFileAttachmentFS)rPrrgrRrTrUs rr r s:{{ cJ/ 05L GGDGG 6 DGG  OO HHLL $E%$););u)D $$$ % 'dkk* fe $ '!%499T\\*d.A.AAdggQVFVdgg  ''rcPt|tr|n|g}td|DS)a~Return True if an /AF value points to an embedded-file specification. /AF normally holds an array of file specification dictionaries; an embedded associated file carries the payload in an /EF entry. A direct (non-array) file spec is tolerated for robustness. Returning False for anything else avoids stripping unrelated keys that merely happen to be named /AF. c3pK|].}t|ttfxrtj|v0yw)N)rrrrEF).0specs r z*_af_holds_embedded_file..Vs4  4*f-.B477d?Bs46)rrany)af candidatess rrjrjMs0""e,2$J  rc$t|ty)aNeutralize actions that reach the network or filesystem, in place. Removes ``/URI``, ``/Launch``, ``/GoToR`` (remote go-to), ``/GoToE`` (embedded go-to), ``/SubmitForm``, and ``/ImportData`` actions wherever they are reachable from document, page, annotation, form-field, and outline (bookmark) action slots, including actions chained via ``/Next``. Link annotations are retained (so any visible underline or box is preserved) but their triggering action is removed, rendering them inert. Visible content and metadata are left intact. URI actions are usually benign hyperlinks; this function is a separate opt-in so callers can decide whether to sever external access. This operation is idempotent and safe to call on a PDF that contains no such actions. Args: pdf: The PDF to modify in place. Note: To scrub document metadata, use :meth:`pikepdf.Pdf.open_metadata` with ``set_pikepdf_as_editor=False`` instead; this function does not touch metadata. N)rW_EXTERNAL_SUBTYPESrcs rrr\s4c-.rc|jD]:}tj|jvs |jtj=<y)aWRemove embedded page thumbnails from a PDF, in place. Deletes the ``/Thumb`` thumbnail image stream from every page. Thumbnails are an optional convenience that viewers can regenerate on the fly, so removing them is safe; doing so reduces file size and avoids stale thumbnails that some editors fail to keep in sync with edited pages. A stale thumbnail can also leak the prior appearance of a page you intended to edit or redact. This operation is idempotent and safe to call on a PDF that has no thumbnails. Args: pdf: The PDF to modify in place. N)rIrThumbrrPrRs rrrys7  % :: !$%rc.|jjtj}t |t sytj |vr|tj =t|jdk(r|jtj=yy)a-Remove an embedded full-text search index from a PDF, in place. Adobe Acrobat can embed a full-text search index in a document to speed up searching. It is stored as a ``/SearchIndex`` entry in the catalog's ``/PieceInfo`` dictionary. This function removes that entry (and the ``/PieceInfo`` dictionary itself if it becomes empty); the index's data streams become unreferenced and are dropped when the PDF is saved. Removing the index reduces file size, re-enables Fast Web View (which an embedded index precludes), and avoids a stale index leaking content you intended to edit or redact. Non-Acrobat viewers do not use it. This operation is idempotent and safe to call on a PDF that has no embedded search index. Args: pdf: The PDF to modify in place. Nr) rGrr PieceInforr SearchIndexr5rA)rP piece_infos rrrsl&dnn-J j* - :% t'' ( :?? " HHT^^ $#rc:t|tt|y)aRemove multimedia and rich-media content from a PDF, in place. Neutralizes ``/Rendition``, ``/Movie``, ``/Sound``, and ``/RichMediaExecute`` actions (wherever reachable from document, page, annotation, outline, and form-field action slots, including ``/Next`` chains), drops the document-level ``/Root/Names/Renditions`` name tree, and defangs media-bearing annotations by stripping their media references: * ``Movie`` annotations lose their ``/Movie`` dictionary; * ``Sound`` annotations lose their ``/Sound`` stream; * ``RichMedia`` annotations lose ``/RichMediaContent`` and ``/RichMediaSettings``; * ``3D`` annotations lose their ``/3DD`` 3D-data reference. ``Screen`` annotations are defanged by removing their ``/Rendition`` action via the action walk above. In every case the annotation itself is retained so page geometry is unchanged. Multimedia handlers (Flash, embedded video, U3D/PRC 3D) are historically a source of parser vulnerabilities, and the underlying media can reference external URLs or files. ``Sound`` and ``Movie`` are deprecated in PDF 2.0. This operation is idempotent and safe to call on a PDF that contains no multimedia content. Args: pdf: The PDF to modify in place. N)rW_MULTIMEDIA_SUBTYPES_remove_multimedia_structuralrcs rrrs:c/0!#&rc2|jjtj}t |t r#tj |vr|tj =|jD]}|jjtj}t |ts=|D]k}t |t s|jtj}t |trtj|nd}|]|D] }||vs||= my)zDDrop the named-renditions tree and defang media-bearing annotations.N) rGrrrerr RenditionsrIrrJrror)rPrgrRrTrUr"rAr=s rrrs HHLL $E%$E)A $// " #dkk*&%(  #EeZ0ii -G5?5N$((1TXD| #%<c  # # #rcttj|jvr|jtj=yy)a1Remove Web Capture (spider) information from a PDF, in place. Deletes the catalog's ``/SpiderInfo`` dictionary, which Adobe Acrobat records when content is captured from the web. It stores source URLs and capture settings, so removing it drops potentially sensitive provenance that is otherwise invisible in the document, and is ignored by viewers that do not implement Web Capture. This operation is idempotent and safe to call on a PDF that has no Web Capture information. Args: pdf: The PDF to modify in place. N)r SpiderInforGrcs rrrs) #((" HHT__ %#rctj|jvr|jtj=|jD]:}tj|jvs |jtj=<y)aRemove private application data (page-piece dictionaries), in place. Deletes every ``/PieceInfo`` page-piece dictionary, both at the document catalog level and on every page. PDF processors use ``/PieceInfo`` to store private, application-specific data (for example, an editor's own editable representation of the page) that the PDF specification does not interpret. Such data can fall out of sync with the visible document and leak content you intended to edit or redact. Removing it does not change how the document renders, but applications that wrote it lose their private editing state. This is a broader operation than :func:`remove_search_index`, which removes only the catalog's ``/PieceInfo/SearchIndex`` entry; this function removes all page-piece data wherever it appears. This operation is idempotent and safe to call on a PDF that has no private application data. Args: pdf: The PDF to modify in place. N)rrrGrIrrs rrrsW, ~~! HHT^^ $ ) >>TXX %()rcttj|jvr|jtj=yy)aRemove the PDF portfolio (collection) presentation, in place. Deletes the catalog's ``/Collection`` dictionary, which marks a document as a *PDF portfolio* (also called a PDF package) and configures how its embedded files are presented in a navigator UI. Removing it causes the document to be presented as an ordinary PDF showing its cover sheet. This does **not** remove the embedded files themselves; pair it with :func:`remove_attachments` if you want the attachments gone as well. A portfolio's navigator can also be driven by JavaScript, so consider :func:`remove_javascript` too. This operation is idempotent and safe to call on a PDF that is not a portfolio. Args: pdf: The PDF to modify in place. N)r CollectionrGrcs rrrs)& #((" HHT__ %#rcheZdZdZddZddZddZddZddZddZ ddZ dd Z dd Z dd Z dd Zy )r aA fluent builder that accumulates sanitization operations. Each ``remove_*`` method records an operation and returns ``self`` so calls can be chained. Nothing happens until :meth:`apply` is called with a PDF; this lets a single :class:`Sanitizer` be configured once and reused across many documents. The action-based removals (JavaScript, external access) are coalesced into a single traversal of the document when applied. The methods correspond to the module-level functions of the same name and have the same scope and caveats. Like those functions, the operations are deliberately limited to the curated, low-risk set; there is no "remove everything" option, because blanket removal of forms, annotations, or XFA usually destroys legitimate content. Example: Configure once, apply to many files:: scrubber = ( pikepdf.sanitize.Sanitizer() .remove_javascript() .remove_external_access() .remove_attachments() ) for path in untrusted_paths: with pikepdf.open(path) as pdf: scrubber.apply(pdf).save(out_dir / path.name) c>t|_d|_g|_y)z6Create an empty sanitizer with no operations recorded.FN)rB_action_subtypes_drop_named_js _structuralselfs r__init__zSanitizer.__init__Es+.5#8:rcF|xjtzc_d|_|S)z@Record removal of all JavaScript. See :func:`remove_javascript`.T)rrarrs rrzSanitizer.remove_javascriptKs  -" rc8|xjtzc_|S)z`Record removal of external-access actions. See :func:`remove_external_access`. )rr|rs rrz Sanitizer.remove_external_accessQs !33 rcD|jjt|S)zARecord removal of embedded files. See :func:`remove_attachments`.)rr4r rs rr zSanitizer.remove_attachmentsY  23 rcD|jjt|S)zARecord removal of page thumbnails. See :func:`remove_thumbnails`.)rr4rrs rrzSanitizer.remove_thumbnails^  12 rcD|jjt|S)z^Record removal of an embedded search index. See :func:`remove_search_index`. )rr4rrs rrzSanitizer.remove_search_indexcs  34 rcv|xjtzc_|jjt|S)zDRecord removal of multimedia content. See :func:`remove_multimedia`.)rrrr4rrs rrzSanitizer.remove_multimediaks. !55  => rcD|jjt|S)zCRecord removal of Web Capture info. See :func:`remove_web_capture`.)rr4rrs rrzSanitizer.remove_web_captureqrrcD|jjt|S)zbRecord removal of private application data. See :func:`remove_private_app_data`. )rr4rrs rrz!Sanitizer.remove_private_app_datavs  78 rcD|jjt|S)zDRecord removal of the portfolio view. See :func:`remove_collection`.)rr4rrs rrzSanitizer.remove_collection~rrc|jrt|t|j|jr t ||j D] }|| |S)aApply the recorded operations to *pdf*, in place. The action-based removals run as a single combined traversal, followed by the structural removals in the order they were recorded. Args: pdf: The PDF to modify in place. Returns: The same ``pdf``, to allow further chaining, e.g. ``.apply(pdf).save(...)``. )rrW frozensetrrbr)rrP operations rapplyzSanitizer.applysT  c9T-B-B#C D    "3 ')) I cN  rN)returnNone)rr )rPr rr )__name__ __module__ __qualname____doc__rrrr rrrrrrrrrr r (s>8;       rr N)r Object | Nonerbool)rr r!frozenset[Name]rr)rr r(set[tuple[int, int]]rr)r,r rz list[Object])r) r6r r!rr(rr7intrr) r<r r=rr!rr(rrr)r<r r!rrr)rPr r!rrr)rQr r!rrr)rPr rr)ryrrr);r __future__rtypingrpikepdf.objectsrrrrcollections.abcr pikepdfr r __all__rrfraURILaunchGoToRGoToE SubmitForm ImportDatar| RenditionMovieSoundRichMediaExecuter RichMediaRichMediaContentRichMediaSettingsr__annotations__r1rr#r)r-r2r>rErWrOrrbr rjrrrrrrrrr rrrrs,# ;;(# $//*+  XXt{{DJJ DOOT__U! ^^TZZT-B-BC JJ JJ NNT**D,B,BCK$v, 3/ -<  "- "- "- "-  "-  "-J2 2 22  2  2, (:+. @#4'n /:%*%8'B#,&&):&.nnr